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Abstract 
Recently, the Commission of the European Communities has put up for discussion various 
reform proposals intended to enhance the reliability of audits and to re-establish trust in the 
financial market. In particular, the EU Commission seeks to strengthen auditor independence 
and to decrease the high level of audit market concentration. Using the example of a ban on 
the joint provision of audit and non-audit services, we show that strengthening auditor inde-
pendence and reducing market concentration may represent competing goals. Neglecting such 
interdependencies in the debate on regulation could thus lead to ill-advised regulatory deci-
sions. 
Our arguments are based on a model that integrates a strategic auditor-manager game into 
a circular market matching model. We show that prohibiting general consulting services can 
result in a decrease in the equilibrium number of audit firms (i.e., in an increase in market 
concentration). Moreover, a ban on the joint supply of general consulting services might even 
have negative effects on the quality of audited financial statements, since the average proba-
bility that managers will misreport increases. Our model predicts the opposite effects for a 
prohibition on audit-related consulting services that managers purchase in order to tempt audi-
tors to compromise their independence. The effects of a ban on “single-provider” auditing and 
consulting thus depend on the kind of services an auditor is allowed to offer and, in particular, 
on the point in time at which consulting services are negotiated.  
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of Audited Financial Statements 
JEL-Classification 




1.  Motivation 
Immediately following the recent financial crisis, there was an outpouring of public criti-
cism aimed at banks, central banks, bank regulators, standard-setters, rating agencies, and 
hedge funds. As many of the financially distressed institutions had only just received unquali-
fied opinions from their auditors, the Commission of the European Communities has begun to 
direct its focus toward the auditing process. With the publication of the Green Paper “Audit 
Policy: Lessons from the Crisis” in October 2010,
1 the EU Commission puts up for discussion 
a variety of measures intended to strengthen the function of auditing, so that in the future the 
auditing process could make a greater contribution to the stabilization of the financial sys-
tem.
2 In November 2011, the EU Commission issued a proposal regarding regulatory reforms 
intended to improve the quality of audits of public-interest entities,
3 as well as a proposal for a 
directive that will attempt to expand the internal market for statutory audits by improving the 
conditions for small and medium-sized firms.
4 
In the current debate, the EU Commission places high priority on the strengthening of au-
ditor independence, i.e., the willingness of statutory auditors to communicate any errors they 
uncover in financial statements to the public. The EU Commission therefore proposes the 
implementation of a limitation on the fees an audit firm can earn from the provision of related 
financial audit services to an audited entity of at most 10% of the fees paid by that entity for 
the statutory audit. In addition, the Commission suggests implementing a cap on the total fees 
from audit and related financial audit services received from a specific public-interest entity 
of 15% (as a proportion of an audit firm’s total revenue) over two consecutive years. Moreo-
ver, the more frequent use of joint audits and the adoption of mandatory audit firm rotation for 
public-interest entities after a maximum period of six years (exceptionally eight years) in ad-
dition to rotation of the key audit partner(s) after seven years are discussed, among other 
measures. Furthermore, the EU Commission suggests a restriction on the joint provision of 
non-audit services.
5 More precisely, the EU Commission proposes that in all cases statutory 
                                                           
1  See Commission of the European Communities 2010. 
2  However, thus far there has been no concrete evidence to suggest that failures in the audit process were ac-
tually responsible for the financial crisis. One subject of critical discussion in this regard was the complaint 
of the Attorney General of New York against Ernst & Young in the case of Lehman Brothers and the actions 
of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Berlin against PricewaterhouseCoopers with regard to SachsenLB. 
3  See Commission of the European Communities 2011b. 
4  See Commission of the European Communities 2011a. 
5  Article 22 Par. 2 of the Statutory Audit Directive 2006/43/EU prescribes that in cases in which an objective, 
reasonable, and informed third party would draw the conclusion that their independence was at risk, auditors 




auditors should be prevented from providing their audit clients with non-audit services that 
are assessed as incompatible with the independent public-interest function of auditing.
6 In 
contrast, for non-audit services that are not fundamentally incompatible with the audit func-
tion, the EU Commission suggests that the audit committee should be empowered to assess 
whether or not the auditor should provide these services to the audited entity;
7 however, audit-
related financial services could still be provided.
8 In general, the idea behind the abolition of 
“single-provider” auditing and consulting is to reduce the business interests of the auditor in 
the audited company. In theory, auditor independence is enhanced when consulting profits 
contingent  on  decisions  regarding  the  audit  certification  are  not  at  stake  (“threat  of  self-
interest”), and when auditors must not assess the results of their own services (“threat of self-
review”). Consequently, the EU Commission argues that large audit firms should not be al-
lowed to supply any non-audit services to public-interest entities and ought not to belong to a 
network that provides non-audit services within the European Union.
9 
The second major criticism raised by the EU Commission is related to the high concentra-
tion of the audit market. Numerous empirical studies have indeed confirmed that the level of 
supplier concentration in the audit market is quite high, most notably in the segment auditing 
listed companies.
10 In most of the internal audit markets of EU Member States, the so-called 
“Big 4”
11 provide audit services to more than 90% of listed companies.
12 Taking into consid-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
vices, has been differently implemented in the various Member States. In France, for example, there is a ban 
on the provision of non-audit services by auditors; other Member States are far less restrictive. 
6  See Commission of the European Communities 2011b, Article 10.3.a. These services include expert services 
unrelated to the audit; tax consultancy; general management and other advisory services; bookkeeping and 
preparation of accounting records and financial statements; designing and implementing internal control or 
risk management; procedures related to the preparation and/or control of financial information included in fi-
nancial statements and advice on risk; valuation services; providing fairness opinions or contribution-in-kind 
reports; actuarial and legal services; designing and implementing financial information technology systems 
for public-interest entities; participating in the client’s internal audit and the provision of services related to 
the internal audit function; and broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services. 
7  See Commission of the European Communities 2011b, Article 10.3.b., which addresses the provision of 
human resources services (including recruiting senior management) and providing comfort letters for inves-
tors in the context of the issuance of an undertaking’s securities. 
8  These services include auditing or reviewing of interim financial statements, providing assurance on corpo-
rate governance statements or on corporate social responsibility matters, providing assurance on or attestation 
of regulatory reporting to regulators of financial institutions beyond the scope of the statutory audit, provid-
ing certification of compliance with tax requirements where such attestation is required by national law, and 
any other statutory duty related to audit work imposed by European Union legislation on the statutory auditor 
or audit firm (see Commission of the European Communities 2011b, Article 10.2). 
9  See Commission of the European Communities 2011b, Article 10.5. A large audit firm is one that generates 
more than one-third of its annual audit revenues from large public-interest entities or belongs to a network 
with combined annual audit revenues within the European Union of more than € 1,500,000,000.  
10   Quick/Wolz 2003 and Bigus/Zimmermann 2008 provide concentration studies of the German audit market, 
and Stefani 2006 investigates the Swiss market for audit services. The General Accounting Office 2008 ana-
lyzes the situation in the US, and Ewert/London Economics 2006 and Le Vourc’h/Morand 2011 present evi-
dence regarding audit market concentration within the EU.  




eration the industry specialization of audit companies, in reality only very few suppliers are 
capable of auditing complex financial institutions. For example, in Germany, auditing and 
consulting services for banks and insurance companies are dominated by only two of the Big 
4 firms.
13 In addition, there is evidence that market concentration is increasing over time.
14 
Most critically, the EU Commission has expressed its fear that the existing supply structure 
contradicts the principles of a free common market and could represent a risk for the function-
ing of market mechanisms. There is also the concern that the collapse of one of the “systemic” 
suppliers could lead to an interruption in the capital market’s supply of audited financial in-
formation, which, in turn, could have negative effects on the stability of the financial system. 
Other stakeholders have also recently expressed their concerns about the high level of audit 
market concentration.
15 
In its current reform proposals, the EU Commission follows a two-pronged policy in which 
“auditor independence” and “market concentration” are generally regarded as two separate 
areas of action. The arguments laid out in the Green Paper and in the recently published pro-
posals implicitly assume that these two problem areas can be considered separately; that is, 
measures strengthening  auditor independence will have, at the most, negligible effects on 
market structure and vice versa, a change in the level of market concentration will not affect 
the quality of audited financial statements. 
In the present paper, we focus on the potential effects of the proposed prohibition of the 
joint supply of audit and non-audit services by audit firms. Using a formal model, we show 
that the abolition of “single-provider” auditing and consulting, a measure intended to streng-
then auditor independence, can also have adverse effects on market structure. Thus, streng-
thening auditor independence and reducing market concentration may represent competing 
goals. This conflict, however, has not yet been sufficiently addressed either by the EU Com-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12  See Ewert/London Economics 2006, p. 22f., and Le Vourc’h/Morand 2011, p. 89ff. 
13  Le Vourc’h/Morand 2011 document similar findings in their analysis of market concentration by category of 
industry in EU Member States. 
14  Studies spanning several years are presented by Köhler et al. 2010 and by Quick/Sattler 2011. 
15  The House of Lords (see House of Lords 2011a, House of Lords 2011b) and the British Office of Fair Trad-
ing (OFT) (see Office of Fair Trading 2011b) have articulated concerns about audit quality and the high con-
centration of suppliers in the UK’s national audit market. The OFT notes that in 2010 the Big 4 firms in ag-
gregate accounted for 99% (98.5%) of the audit fees paid by FTSE-100 (FTSE-250) companies. As a result, 
the OFT has referred the market for the supply of statutory audit services to large companies in the UK to the 
Competition Commission for further investigation (see Office of Fair Trading 2011a). In addition, the OFT 
has proposed measures intended to counteract the fact that market shares are unequally distributed between 




mission or in the academic literature.
16 The failure to anticipate mutual interference of the 
proposed measures could lead to counterproductive regulatory decisions. 
Our arguments are based on a model that integrates a strategic game between a manager 
and an auditor into a market model in the tradition of the circular market matching models 
introduced by Schmalensee 1978 and Salop 1979. Using a strategic auditor-manager game, 
we investigate the managers’ incentives to misreport their firms’ bad economic conditions, as 
well as the auditors’ incentives to exert high audit effort (in order to detect misreporting) and 
to correctly report their findings to the public. We assume that the auditors’ effort costs de-
pend on their specialization with regard to the clients’ audit-relevant characteristics. We de-
termine the auditors’ ex ante expected costs for auditing a specific client, and determine cost-
covering audit fees by assuming Bertrand competition between audit firms. The zero-profit 
constraint then leads to the equilibrium number of audit firms active in the market for audit 
services. 
Regulation regarding the scope of services the auditor is allowed to provide differs signifi-
cantly across the EU Member States, and in some countries the provision of consulting ser-
vices is not significantly restricted. In its proposals, the EU Commission differentiates be-
tween non-audit services (services that are incompatible with the audit function) and related 
financial audit services. Thus, we analyze three different scenarios: 
First, we consider the case in which audit firms are not allowed to provide non-audit ser-
vices to their audit clients. To show the effects of the proposed ban on “single-provider” au-
diting, we use the results of Case I as a reference point, i.e., we compare Case I with two ad-
ditional scenarios in which audit firms are permitted to offer different kinds of non-audit ser-
vices.  
Second, we investigate a scenario in which audit firms are allowed to supply general non-
audit-related consulting services in addition to the audit. Since audit and consulting services 
are negotiated simultaneously and fees are sunk at the point in time in which decisions during 
the audit process are made, non-audit fees do not affect auditor independence in our single-
period setting. However, the option to provide general, non-audit-related consulting services 
increases audit firms’ profit contributions and thus the equilibrium number of audit firms. The 
resulting increase in the degree of auditor industry specialization tends to reduce the addition-
                                                           
16  Comunale/Sexton 2005 investigate the effects of mandatory auditor rotation and multi-year appointment of 
auditors on the resulting market share by means of a Markov model; Bleibtreu/Stefani 2011 present a formal 




al cost of exerting high audit effort; this, in turn, decreases the average probability that man-
agers will misrepresent negative economic circumstances. Since the possibility to buy con-
sulting services ex ante does not alter the managers’ decision-relevant payoffs, the auditors’ 
strategies are unaffected. Thus, the average quality of audited financial statements is actually 
higher in a situation in which “single-provider” auditing and consulting is allowed (i.e., our 
model predicts a negative relationship between the level of market concentration and the qual-
ity of audited financial statements). An additional effect of the joint provision of audit and 
non-audit services is that average audit fees are lower than when audit firms provide audit 
services only. Overall, the prohibition of audit firms providing consulting services would ac-
tually increase concentration (i.e., reduce the number of audit firms) and simultaneously de-
crease the quality of financial reporting (i.e., increase the percentage of deceptive financial 
reports). This result is the exact opposite of the aims the Commission has outlined in its recent 
reform proposals. 
Third, we analyze a scenario in which managers request audit-related non-audit services in 
order to tempt auditors to compromise their independence. More precisely, audit-related con-
sulting services are purchased in return for a clean audit opinion after the auditor has detected 
a false report. We assume that auditors have superior bargaining power in setting non-audit 
fees. Our results indicate that since auditors benefit from the additional supply of non-audit 
services, the individual probability that managers will misreport decreases; as was the case 
with the provision of general consulting services, the managers’ payoffs and thus the auditors’ 
strategy remain unchanged. Thus, auditors’ expected costs (but also their audit fees and their 
profit contribution) decrease as a result of the additional supply of non-audit services. This, in 
turn, leads to a decrease in the number of audit firms. An effective ban on the provision of 
audit-related consulting services would thus indeed increase the number of audit firms, i.e., 
would decrease the level of market concentration.  
We can sum up our findings as follows: First, measures intended to strengthen auditor in-
dependence might have unintended secondary effects on the already high level of supplier 
concentration. Second, if the effects on the equilibrium number of audit firms resulting from 
the prohibition of non-audit services are taken into account, a ban on “single-provider” audit-
ing and consulting might even have adverse effects on the quality of audited financial state-
ments. Third, the effects outlined above depend on the kind of non-audit services the auditor 




The paper is organized into five sections. In Section 2, we briefly review the relevant lite-
rature. Section 3 presents our model and an analysis of a situation in which audit firms are not 
allowed to provide consulting services. In Section 4, we investigate the effects of the supply 
of general, non-audit-related consulting services in addition to the audit, as well as the effects 
of the joint provision of audit-related consulting services. Section 5 summarizes our principal 
findings and derives conclusions regarding the EU Commission’s proposal for audit market 
regulation.  
2.  Related Literature 
To date, only a few analytical papers have directly addressed the effects of the joint supply 
of audit and non-audit services. Wu 2006, for example, presents a model in which accounting 
firms provide both audit and non-audit services, examining how competitive behavior in the 
markets for audit services and for non-audit services, respectively, affects oligopolistic com-
petition in the other market. Although knowledge spillovers from auditing to consulting or 
vice versa (e.g., in the form of cost savings) are always beneficial to auditors, knowledge spil-
lovers also provide an economic link between the two markets. Since oligopolistic competi-
tion in one of the markets will affect audit firms’ strategies in the other market (“competition 
crossovers”), knowledge spillovers can thus result in aggressive competition (e.g., price re-
ductions). Based on a Cournot duopoly game in quantities, Wu 2006 analyzes the trade-off 
between these two economic forces in oligopolistic markets and audit fee price-setting. In 
contrast to our paper, Wu 2006 emphasizes the resulting market equilibrium rather than the 
strategic interaction between auditors and clients. 
Beck/Wu 2006 focus on the trade-off between audit fees and audit quality. They present a 
non-strategic, dynamic Bayesian model to analyze audit quality, which is measured as the 
precision of the auditor’s posterior beliefs regarding client-specific characteristics. In their 
model, audit quality is affected by two components: Auditors learn from doing audits over 
time  (“learning  effect”),  and  auditors  can  perform  non-audit  services  that  influence  their 
clients’ managerial decisions (“business advisory effect”). Consequently, providing non-audit 
services enables auditors to anticipate changes in their clients’ business models. The results of 
Beck/Wu 2006 indicate that large professional fees can lead auditors to provide non-audit 




garding the existence of knowledge spillovers is mixed,
17 our model neglects both information 
effects and direct cost reductions resulting from the joint supply of the two services, focusing 
instead on the effects on market structure. 
DeAngelo 1981 defines audit quality as the market-assessed joint probability that auditors 
will  both  discover  and  report  material  misstatements  in  their  clients’  accounting  systems. 
Based on her model, DeAngelo 1981 argues that the ratio between the economic advantage an 
auditor derives from one client (the “quasi-rent”) and the sum of the economic advantages 
earned from providing services to all clients is crucial for auditor independence. The provi-
sion of non-audit services can increase the profit contribution derived from one specific client, 
thus raising the economic advantage auditors would put at risk should they deviate from an 
unqualified audit opinion. 
In line with this argument, Beck et al. 1988 analyzes the relationship between non-audit 
services and auditor independence, demonstrating that the provision of recurring non-audit 
services that decrease the auditor’s start-up costs for auditing a client can decrease the quasi-
rent derived from that particular client, and thus reduce the threat to auditor independence. 
Non-recurring non-audit services, however, are predicted to increase the client-specific quasi-
rent only if knowledge spillovers reduce the ongoing costs for auditing the client.
18 Although 
Beck et al. 1988 offer a detailed explanation of the conditions that must be fulfilled in order 
for non-audit services to increase the client-specific quasi-rent, the authors do not specifically 
determine the ratio of quasi-rents that indicates a threat to auditor independence, as neither the 
behavior of other clients nor the effect of allowing or prohibiting non-audit services on an 
auditor’s market share is explicitly modeled. In the present paper, in contrast, market shares 
and  the  equilibrium  number  of  audit  firms  are  endogenously  determined  within  a  market 
matching model. Our model therefore allows investigation of the relationship between the 
scope of services auditors are permitted to provide and market shares, as well as the effect of 
auditors’ market shares on the quality of audited financial statements.  
                                                           
17  Most of the studies using a single-equation model with audit fees (non-audit fees) as a dependent (indepen-
dent) variable have found a positive relationship between non-audit fees and audit fees (see Simunic 1984, 
Simon 1985, DeBerg et al. 1991, Butterworth/Houghton 1995, Ezzamel et al. 1996, Craswell/Francis 1999, 
Bell et al. 2001), which could be the result of knowledge spillovers. However, models taking the endogeneity 
between non-audit fees and audit fees into account have shown that these findings might be the result of a bi-
ased estimation of the non-audit fee coefficient (see Whisenant et al. 2003; Antle et al. 2006 provide contra-
dictory results). In addition, studies based on audit staff hours did not find evidence consistent with the exis-
tence of audit production efficiencies arising from knowledge spillovers (see Davis et al. 1993, O'Keefe et al. 
1994).  




The idea of applying a market matching model to the audit market has also been proposed 
by Chan 1999 and by Simons/Zein 2011. To model auditors’ decisions regarding the level of 
audit quality they will supply (i.e., quality-related audit market segmentation), Simons/Zein 
2011 adopt a linear market matching model based on Hotelling 1929. One interesting finding 
is that improving the market position of mid-tier audit firms can lead to a decrease in overall 
audit quality. Chan 1999 uses a three-stage variant of the Hotelling 1929 spatial-competition 
model, taking into account auditors’ start-up costs and thus relationship-specific economic 
interests. He focuses on auditors’ decisions regarding their specialization with respect to client 
characteristics and on the economic implications of low-balling. However, neither Chan 1999 
nor Simons/Zein 2011 address the effects of non-audit services.  
This paper is closely related to the model presented by Bleibtreu/Stefani 2011, who also 
use a circular market matching model. However, the focus of Bleibtreu/Stefani 2011 is on the 
effects of a prohibition of non-audit services on the equilibrium number of different types of 
audit firms. In particular, they differentiate between generalist audit firms that can provide 
consulting and audit services and small audit firms specialized in auditing small corporations. 
Large audit firms are assumed to have higher fixed costs and higher costs for planning the 
audit process, whereas small audit firms have higher costs per unit of auditing clients for 
which they are not perfectly specialized. In addition, knowledge spillovers flowing from non-
audit to audit services reduce the costs incurred in planning the audit process. The results in-
dicate that prohibiting the provision of non-audit services to audit clients has direct effects on 
the structure of the audit market. In particular, Bleibtreu/Stefani 2011 show that the effect that 
a prohibition of the joint supply of audit and non-audit services has on the equilibrium market 
structure depends on the cost structures of small and large suppliers of audit services, and on 
the degree of competition for small audit clients. One drawback of their study is that the stra-
tegic interaction between managers and auditors is not explicitly modeled; in the present pa-
per, we address managers’ reporting decisions and auditors’ effort choices, and thus directly 
investigate the effect the scope of services has on the quality of audited financial statements. 
3.  Model 
3.1.  General Structure of the Model 
In  the  present  paper,  we  jointly  investigate  (1)  the  matching  between  audit  firms  and 




ic interaction between auditors and clients during the auditor-client contractual relationship. 
Consequently, we integrate two separate games into our model: 
We use a sequential game to model the decision-making of the auditor and the company to 
be audited in the phase of preparing and auditing financial statements, i.e., after the two par-
ties have entered into an audit contract. In this game, managers make decisions about the 
quality of their company’s financial statements, and auditors determine audit quality, i.e., the 
audit effort exerted for a specific client and the corresponding reporting strategy (which is 
contingent on the findings uncovered during the audit). We apply backwards induction to de-
rive the managers’ and auditors’ optimal strategies regarding financial reporting and audit 
quality, respectively. 
In addition, we apply the circular location model proposed by Salop 1979 to analyze audit 
fee price-setting during the negotiating process. More precisely, we embed the optimal deci-
sions from the strategic game between auditors and clients, which determine expected audit 
costs and reputational effects, into a market matching model. This allows us to derive the ac-
tual level of audit fees, the equilibrium matching between clients and audit firms, and the re-
sulting market share distribution. 
The joint analysis of the matching between clients and audit firms and thus of equilibrium 
market shares (ex ante) on the one hand and auditors’ and clients’ decision-making during the 
process of preparing and auditing financial statements (ex post) on the other enables us to ad-
dress the effect of the number of audit firms on audit quality and, conversely, how the incen-
tive-influenced strategic interaction of players affects the market shares of audit firms. Our 
model allows simultaneous consideration of both audit market concentration and the quality 
of audited financial statements. In particular, we investigate the effects resulting from a prohi-
bition of the supply of non-audit services to audit clients. 
To analyze the effect of the joint provision of auditing and consulting services, we consider 
three scenarios with different approaches to the additional supply of non-audit services to au-
dit clients. Case I, in which audit firms do not provide consulting services at all, serves as the 
benchmark case. In Case II, audit firms offer general, non-audit-related consulting services. 
Consulting services and audit services are simultaneously negotiated. In Case III, audit firms 
can extend the audit by audit-related non-audit services; in contrast to Case II, non-audit ser-
vices are negotiated only after the auditor has detected the manager’s misrepresentation of the 




that purchasing of non-audit services in Case III is optional. For simplicity, we assume in 
Case II that general consulting services are valuable for all clients, and thus all clients actually 
demand non-audit services.
19  
3.2.  Strategic Auditor-Manager Interaction (Case I) 
To analyze the strategic auditor-manager interaction during the process of preparing and 
verifying a company’s financial statements, we start from the assumption that a manager and 
an auditor have already entered into an audit contract that determines the audit fee,  A fee . 
Thus, the audit fee is fixed for the following game. In the next step, we use the market match-
ing  model  described  in  the  subsequent  section  to  determine  cost-covering  audit  fees  that 
emerge as the equilibrium of a game between n competing audit firms. 
As a reference point, we first describe Case I, in which audit firms are not allowed to 
supply non-audit services to audit clients. For Case I, Figure 1 illustrates the timeline of the 
players’ decisions, their respective information sets, and the payoffs resulting from the play-
ers’ choices.  
Figure 1 
We assume that after both parties have agreed upon the audit contract, one of two different 
economic states of the company, good (G ) or bad (B), can emerge. With the exogenous 
probability 0 1 < < B q , the economic condition of the client is bad; the economic condition is 
good with the probability of the complementary event ( 1 = - G B q q ).  
For simplicity, we presume that managers do not have an incentive to under-report the 
economic condition of their firm – for example, in order to meet analysts’ forecasts, to signal 
the poor performance of their predecessors in the case of a change in the board of executive 
directors,
20 or to set aside earnings for future fiscal years if managers’ bonuses are already 
                                                           
19  However, our results would remain unchanged if only some clients bought non-audit services, provided that 
each audit firm has an identical share in the market for consulting services. 
20  There is empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis: Cotter et al. 1998 found that senior management 
changes are associated with greater write-downs taken to the income statement. Pourciau 1993 provides evi-
dence that incoming executives manage accruals to decrease earnings in the year of an executive change and 
increase earnings the following year. Wilson/Wang 2010 found significant income-decreasing earnings man-
agement in years in which both a change of CEO and a change of board chairperson took place. However, 
Murphy/Zimmerman 1993 found discretionary influence on turnover-related changes in R&D, advertising, 
capital expenditures, and accounting accruals only in poorly performing firms experiencing a non-routine 





21 In our model, managers thus always report G  truthfully, i.e.,  ( ) r G G = . How-
ever, if the economic condition of the company is bad, managers must decide whether they 
should report truthfully ( ( ) r B B = ) or falsely report that the firm is in good shape ( ( ) r B G =
): (1) If managers truthfully report  ( ) r B B = , their utility decreases by  t d . The decrease in 
utility  t d  can be interpreted as a consequence of capital markets reacting negatively to bad 
news or as a reduction in managers’ performance-contingent payments. (2) Managers can 
exert some manipulation effort m ( t m d < ) to overstate the economic condition of their firm 
(i.e.,  ( ) r B G = ).
22 In doing so, however, managers must accept the risk that auditors will 
detect their misreporting and refuse to issue a clean audit opinion for their financial state-
ments. A qualified or adverse audit report would result in a decrease of  d d  in the managers’ 
utility, signifying a loss of reputation, a decrease in performance-based compensation, or ad-
verse reactions by investors or creditors.
23 We assume  d t d d > , i.e., that consequences for a 
manager who is caught misreporting are more severe than those for a manager who honestly 
and voluntarily admits the bad economic condition of the corporation. We denote the proba-
bility that managers will distort financial statements (i.e.,  ( ) r B G = ) as  d Pr . 
With regard to audit effort, we consider two alternatives: (1) Auditors can exert high effort 
(he), which enables them to perfectly observe their client’s actual economic condition, or (2) 
choose low effort (le), which allows misstatements in the client’s financial reports to remain 
undetected. Exerting high audit effort induces higher audit costs than low audit effort, i.e., 
he le c c > . We describe these costs in more detail in the next section. 
We assume that auditors cannot observe their client’s economic condition prior to conduct-
ing the audit. If, however, managers have truthfully reported negative economic conditions, 
auditors do not need to exert high audit effort, since  ( ) r B B =  is always credible. Thus, audi-
tors issue a clean opinion on the report  ( ) r B B =  and earn the profit contribution  A le fee c -  
for the audit. If, on the other hand, managers have reported  ( ) r B G =  or  ( ) r G G = , auditors 
are only imperfectly informed about their clients’ actual economic condition when choosing 
                                                           
21  Healy 1985 and Holthausen et al. 1995 present empirical evidence in line with the “big bath” hypothesis. 
22  There is empirical evidence indicating that managers engage in earnings management to maximize their 
performance-contingent payments (see, for example, Healy 1985, Balsam 1998, Guidry et al. 1999, and 
Holthausen et al. 1995). In addition, there is evidence that managers avoid reporting earnings that fall short of 
analyst forecasts (see, for example, Burgstahler/Eames 2006). 




their audit effort: (1) If auditors exert low effort, they cannot determine whether the actual 
situation is G  or B, i.e., they cannot prove that  ( ) r B G =  is misleading. Thus, auditors will 
have to issue a clean audit report on  ( ) r B G =  as well as on  ( ) r G G = . If it later turns out 
that the economic condition was actually B and that  ( ) r B G =  was therefore deceptive, audi-
tors will face a loss of RL (e.g., reputational damages or legal action initiated by third par-
ties), which must be subtracted from the profit contribution,  A le fee c - .
24 (2) If auditors exert 
high audit effort, they can perfectly reveal the actual economic situation of the firm. Thus, 
they will know that  ( ) r G G =  is true and issue a clean audit opinion, but will only earn the 
lower profit contribution,  A he fee c - . Auditors exerting high effort can also prove that the re-
port  ( ) r B G =  is misleading and can then decide whether they will report their findings truth-
fully (qualified or adverse audit opinion) or whether they prefer to conceal their findings 
(clean audit opinion). If they decide not to issue a clean opinion, they can realize a reputation-
al gain ( RG ) in addition to the profit contribution,  A he fee c - ; after knowingly issuing an un-
earned clean audit opinion for  ( ) r B G = , they risk reputational losses of RL, which must be 
subtracted from the profit contribution. We define RG RL R + º ,  he Pr  as the probability that 
auditors will choose a high effort level after having observed  ( ) r B G =  or  ( ) r G G = , and  r Pr  
as the probability that the auditor will not issue a clean audit opinion after uncovering a miss-
tated report of  ( ) r B G =  (i.e., the probability that the auditor will remain independent). 
We  make  the  standard  assumptions  of  risk  neutrality,  perfect  rationality,  and  common 
knowledge of these attributes and of all payoffs and probabilities. We apply backwards induc-
tion to determine the players’ optimal strategies. 
Given the payoffs described above, auditors who have exerted high audit effort will truth-
fully report their eventual findings that a manager’s report of  ( ) r B G =  misstates the eco-
                                                           
24  The most prominent example is perhaps the financial scandal involving Enron, which resulted in heavy dam-
age to the reputation of Arthur Andersen, a wave of clients changing their statutory auditor following Arthur 
Andersen’s  indictment,  and  finally  the  audit  firm’s  demise  soon  after  convictions  were  obtained. 
Chaney/Philipich 2002, Krishnamurthy et al. 2006, and Asthana et al. 2010, among others, found that the 




nomic condition of the firm, i.e.,  1 r Pr = .
25 In the next step, we determine auditors’ effort 
choices and managers’ reporting strategies: 
(1) If managers truthfully report  ( ) r B B = , auditors always choose low audit effort in or-
der to save the difference in costs  he le c c c - º D  for auditing the client. (2) If managers report 
( ) r G G =  or  ( ) r B G = , in contrast, the auditor does not know the actual economic condition 
of the firm prior to conducting the audit. Although auditors make their audit effort choices 
chronologically after managers have decided how to report, the players’ strategies can be ana-
lyzed as simultaneous decisions. If managers do not distort financial reports with certainty, 
there is obviously no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Auditors exert high audit effort if 
the  probability  of  distorted  financial  statements,  d Pr ,  is  relatively  high,  i.e.,  if 











. Thus, managers will report  ( ) r B G =  with probability  












because at this level, auditors are indifferent about whether to exert high or low effort after 
observing reports of good economic conditions. We assume that reputational effects are rela-
tively large in comparison to the difference in audit costs, i.e.,  B R c q × > D . Consequently, 
managers randomize between their pure strategies ( ) 1 d Pr
* < .  
Managers prefer  ( ) r B G =  over  ( ) r B B =  if the probability of high audit effort,  he Pr , is 








£ . Managers are therefore indifferent with respect to misre-
porting or truthfully reporting a bad economic condition if auditors exert high audit effort 









= < .  
These probabilities specify the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Our model resembles 
the Matching Pennies games that have frequently been applied to study problems inherent to 
                                                           
25  In Case I of our model, the problem of auditor independence (see DeAngelo 1981, Antle 1984, Magee/Tseng 





26 As in these Matching Pennies games, the probability that the audi-
tor will exert high audit effort depends only on the manager’s payoffs, whereas the manager’s 
probability of misreporting depends only on the auditor’s payoffs.
27  
3.3.  Market Matching Model (Case I) 
To derive audit fees and the equilibrium number of audit firms, we apply the circular mar-
ket matching model presented by Salop 1979 to our audit market. Again, we first consider 
Case I, in which auditors do not provide non-audit services. We assume that all of the audi-
tors’ potential clients are uniformly distributed on a unit circle. The position of a client on the 
unit circle describes its audit-relevant characteristics, such as its complexity, industry diversi-
fication, number of business areas, geographic dispersion of operations, corporate structure, 
listing status, or accounting standard in use. We assume that clients are distributed conti-
nuously on the unit circle and normalize the mass of clients to 1. In addition, we assume that a 
certain discrete number n ( 1,2,..., i n = ) of audit firms is also uniformly distributed on the 
unit circle.
28 The position of an audit firm on the unit circle determines the correspondence 
between the audit firm’s specialization and a client’s characteristics, i.e., the auditor’s indus-
try specialization. The structure of this model is visualized in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 
The larger the difference between a client’s characteristics and an audit firm’s specializa-
tion (i.e., the larger the distance x between client and auditor on the unit circle), the higher the 
costs for auditing this specific client.
 29 Thus, we assume that the audit costs  he c  and  le c  de-
scribed above increase linearly with the distance x,
30 and that the costs  ( ) he c x  for exerting 
high audit effort increase at a faster rate than the costs  ( ) le c x  for low audit effort.
 More pre-
                                                           
26   See Magee 1980 and Fellingham/Newman 1985. Smith et al. 2000 have extended the model sequentially by 
offering the auditor the choice of auditing the internal control system before a Matching Pennies game is 
played. Anderson/Young 1988 use a similar game for planning internal audits, as have Matsumura/Tucker 
1995  and  Tucker/Matsumura  1997  for  second-partner  reviews.  For  extensions  of  the  basic  model,  see 
Fellingham et al. 1989, Newman/Noel 1989, Patterson 1993, Bloomfield 1995, and Newman et al. 2001.  
27   Goeree/Holt 2001, Goeree et al. 2003, Bloomfield 1997, and Fischbacher/Stefani 2007 have investigated the 
(often counter-intuitive) behavioral predictions of Matching Pennies games and document experimental re-
sults regarding their predictive power. 
28   The uniform distribution of audit firms also emerges in equilibrium (see Salop 1979). 
29  O'Keefe et al. 1994 found that client characteristics explain more than 80% of the cross-sectional variation in 
the quantity of professional labor input. Audit fee pricing studies also confirm that the characteristics of the 
client and the auditor-client relationship explain the variance in audit fees to a large extent (for a meta-
analysis of the audit fee studies, see Hay et al. 2006b). 




cisely, we presume that the respective costs for exerting high and low effort in auditing a spe-
cific client located x units away from its audit firm are  
(3)  ( ) he he c x a x = ×  and  ( ) le le c x a x = × , with  he le a a >  and  he le a a a - º D . 
To derive equilibrium audit fees, we provisionally use a fixed number n of audit firms ac-
tive in the market. We consider two arbitrary audit firms, i  and  1 i - , located next to each 
other on the unit circle, and an arbitrary client located in between the two audit firms, at a 
distance of  1 2 x n ¢ <  to audit firm i . Thus, audit firm i  is more specialized in the potential 
client’s characteristics than audit firm  1 i -  is, and therefore has a cost advantage over audit 
firm  1 i - . The costs incurred by audit firm i  for auditing the client at distance  x¢  are  he a x¢ ×  
when high audit effort is exerted and  le a x¢ ×  for low audit effort.  
Given the cost structure outlined above, a manager’s individual equilibrium probability to 
misreport is not identical across clients, since  ( ) d Pr x
*  depends on the distance x to the audit 
firm: 
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- × D ×
× >
-D ×
. Because additionally exerting high audit effort 
becomes comparatively more expensive the less specialized the audit firm is in its client’s 
business, the client’s option of misreporting becomes more attractive with larger values of x. 
The probability of a deceptive report,  ( ) d Pr x
* , increases with  he a  and decreases with  le a . To 
ensure  ( ) 1 d Pr x
* <  for every possible distance x, we adjust our assumption  B R c q × > D  from 
above to  2 B R a q × > D , because in our model  1 2 x =  is the largest possible distance between 
an audit firm and its client ( 1 n= ).  
As derived in the preceding section, audit firms randomize between exerting high and low 
audit effort (i.e., they exert high audit effort with probability  he Pr
*), and clients randomize 




probability  ( ) d Pr x
* ).
31 The respective costs audit firms i  and  1 i -  can ex ante expect from 
performing an audit for a client at a distance  1 2 x n ¢ <  away from audit firm i  are thus given 
by  
(4)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
i
le B he B he d E c x a Pr a Pr a Pr x x q q
* * * ¢ ¢ ¢     = + - × ×D + × ×D × ×      and  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1
i
le B he B he d E c n x a Pr a Pr a Pr n x n x . q q
- * * * ¢ ¢ ¢     - = + - × ×D + × ×D × - × -      
The probability of misreporting,  ( ) d Pr x
* , has an aggravating influence on the expected audit 
effort costs. Since  ( ) 0 d Pr x x
* ¶ ¶ > , the probability that managers will misreport bad eco-
nomic conditions is higher for clients at a great distance than for clients located near the audit 
firm.  In  addition,  audit  effort  costs  ( ) he he c x a x = ×  and  ( ) le le c x a x = ×  (and  thus  also 
c a x D = D × ) directly increase with the distance between the audit firm and its client. Overall, 
for clients at a distance  1 2 x n ¢ < , the expected audit costs of audit firm i  are always lower 
than the expected audit costs of its competitor  1 i -  ( ( ) ( )
1 1
i i E c x E c n x
- ¢ ¢     < -     ).  
In addition to the direct audit effort costs, the respective reputational effects audit firms i  
and  1 i -  expect ex ante must also be taken into account: 
(5)  ( ) ( ) ( )
i
B he d E Re x Pr R RL Pr x q
* * ¢ ¢   = × × - ×    and  
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
i
B he d E Re n x Pr R RL Pr n x q
- * * ¢ ¢   - = × × - × -   . 
Again, the expected reputational effects become more severe as the distance between audit 
firm and client increases ( ( ) 0 d Pr x x
* ¶ ¶ > ). Whether the expected reputational effect is posi-





Pr R RL RG RL RL
d
* -
× - = × + - . Intui-
tively, the expected reputational effect will be negative (positive) for relatively high (low) 
values of  RL and low (high) values of  RG . Moreover, an auditor’s expected reputational 
effect will be negative (positive) for relatively high (low) values of a manager’s decrease in 
utility resulting from an adverse audit opinion,  d d , and for high (low) values of a manager’s 
effort costs for misrepresentation of a bad economic situation m (because the probability that 
                                                           
31   If  0 x = , managers apply a pure strategy (i.e.,  ( ) 0 0 d Pr
* = ). However, this does not affect our results, since 




auditors will exert high effort decreases with both  d d  and m). The expected reputational ef-
fect is also negative (positive) when  t d , the decrease in utility affecting managers who truth-
fully report a bad economic condition, is relatively low (high) (because the probability that 
auditors  will  exert  high  effort  decreases  with  t d ).  In  the  following  analysis,  we  assume 
0
*× - < he Pr R RL , i.e., the reputational effect acts as a disincentive to auditors who might fail 
to exert high effort (or to report their findings correctly). Given this assumption, the expected 
reputational effect for audit firm i  from auditing the client at distance  1 2 x n ¢ <  is less severe 
than that for audit firm  1 i - , i.e.,  ( ) ( )
1 1
i i E Re x E Re n x
- ¢ ¢     > -    . The (negative) reputa-
tional effect must be subtracted from the expected audit costs in order to calculate expected 
reputation-adjusted audit costs.  
In equilibrium, auditors select a probability of exerting high effort that renders clients in-
different with respect to misreporting or truthfully reporting the bad economic condition of 
their company. The utility that a client can expect after having engaged an audit firm can thus 
be calculated as 
(6) 
M
B t E U d q   = - ×   , 
since the audit fee,  ( )
i fee x , can be regarded as sunk after the contract has been signed. Be-
cause 
M E U     does not depend on the distance between the client and its audit firm, manag-
ers simply choose the audit firm offering the lowest fee. To determine audit fees, we assume 
Bertrand price competition, i.e., audit firms i  and  1 i -  undercut each other’s fee offers up to 
the point at which one audit firm reaches its own expected reputation-adjusted audit costs. As 
audit effort costs are lower and expected reputational effects are less severe for audit firm i  
than for audit firm  1 i - , audit firm i  gets the contracts with clients at distance  1 2 x n ¢ < , i.e., 
a company always selects the audit firm located nearest to the client. 
These results for a client at a specific distance  x¢  can be generalized to all clients located 
in the region  1 2 x n £  in between two arbitrary audit firms i  and  1 i - . The highest fee audit 
firm i  can demand is equal to the expected reputation-adjusted audit costs of the competitor 
1 i -  located nearest to audit firm i , since this competitor’s expected costs are the last fee 
offer of that audit firm. The expected reputation-adjusted audit costs for audit firm i  for au-
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( ) ( )
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i i i
le B he B he d
B he d
E C x E c x E Re x
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      = -      
  = + - × ×D + × ×D × ×  
- × × - ×
 
whereas the expected reputation-adjusted audit costs for audit firm  1 i-  (and thus the fee audit 
firm i  can demand) are  
(8) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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fee x E C n x
             a Pr a Pr a Pr n x n x






  = -  
¢ ¢   = + - × ×D + × ×D × - × -  
- × × - × -
  
The reputation-adjusted audit costs of audit firm i  increase with the distance x between audit 
firm i  and the client, while audit fees increase (decrease) with the distance between audit firm 
1 - i  (audit firm i ) and the client.  
The  expected  profit  contribution  of  audit  firm i  from  auditing  some  client  at  distance 
1 2 x n £  can be calculated by subtracting the expected reputation-adjusted audit costs of au-
dit firm i  from the audit fees demanded: 
(9) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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    = -    
= × - + - × ×D × -
  + × ×D × - × - - ×  
  - × × - × - -  
 
Given a certain number n of audit firms on the market, the expected overall profit contri-
bution of audit firm i  can be computed by integration and multiplication by 2 (in order to 
take both sides of the unit circle into account): 
(10) 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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    = ×    
= + - × ×D
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which can be simplified to 
(10a) 
( ) ( )













E PC n E pc x dx
a n a R
RL
n a R R a n
q
    = ×    
  D   = + × - × × × +     D - ×D      
∫
 
Since  ( ) 0
i E PC n n   ¶ ¶ <   , the expected overall profit contribution of an arbitrary audit firm 
decreases with the number of audit firms n.  
We assume that every audit firm incurs some fixed costs  FA c  in addition to the expected di-
rect audit effort costs and reputational effects. These fixed costs can also be interpreted as a 
market entry barrier. Subtracting the fixed costs  FA c  from the expected overall profit contribu-
tion,  ( )
i E PC n    , allows calculation of an audit firm’s expected profits. If audit firms can 
earn positive profits, new suppliers will enter the market.
32 If profits are negative, audit firms 
will leave the market.
33 Thus, the equilibrium number of audit firms, 
* n , can be calculated by 
solving  
(11)  ( )
* i
FA E PC n c   =    
for  n
*. We consider the probability that the manager’s published financial statements will 
accurately reflect the economic condition of the audited company, i.e., 
(12)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1
* * * *
B d he he r Pr x Pr Pr Pr q   F = - × × - + -   , 
as  a  measure  of  the  quality  of  a  specific  client’s  audited  financial  statements.  Given  the 
payoffs  for  Case  I,  auditors  are  always  independent  ( 1
*
r Pr = ),  i.e.,  F  reduces  to 
( ) ( ) 1 1
* *
B d he Pr x Pr q - × × - . This formulation has two interpretations. First, the quality of au-
dited financial statements is not identical across an audit firm’s clients: The greater the dis-
tance  x ,  the  larger  the  individual  probability  ( )
*
d Pr x  that  the  manager  will  misreport  (
                                                           
32  The current estimation is that the sector for audits of large companies is not attractive enough to encourage 
additional providers to enter the market, i.e., the potential risks and returns do not justify the necessary in-
vestment (see PricewaterhouseCoopers 2010, par. 17). 
33  For example, the General Accounting Office 2003 discusses the fact that a number of small audit firms exited 
the market after the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, because of the increase in the costs of auditing 





( ) 0 d Pr x x
* ¶ ¶ > ),  and  the  lower  the  quality  F  of  disclosed  information  ( 0 x ¶F ¶ < ).
34 
Second, the quality of audited financial statements also depends on the equilibrium number n 
of audit firms active in the market: Since the maximum possible distance between audit firm 
and auditee ( 1 2
max x n = ) decreases with n, the upper value for the probability that managers 
will misreport bad economic conditions at their firms also decreases with n:  





























* - D ×
¶ ¶ = - × <
- D
. 
Intuitively, a low number of audit firms active in the market (i.e., a high level of audit market 
concentration) means that there is a comparatively large number of clients unable to find an 
audit firm located nearby (i.e., there is a lack of specialist audit firms). Since the probability 
( ) d Pr x
*  of misreporting increases with the distance x, and the maximum possible distance is 
larger when there are only few audit firms, the average quality of audited financial statements 
decreases with the number n of audit firms. Figure 3 illustrates this effect (for simplicity, 
( ) d Pr x
*  in Figure 3 is assumed to be linear, which is a reasonable approximation given rela-
tively high values of R). 
Figure 3 
Thus, a high level of audit market concentration can indeed have negative consequences on 
the quality of financial information disclosed. In our model, however, the underlying reason is 
not that audit firms skimp on audit effort, because they believe that their dominant market 
position protects them from punishment (as they are “too big to fail”), but rather that manag-
ers exploit the fact that exerting high audit effort becomes more costly as the distance between 
auditor and client increases. The average probability of misrepresenting bad economic condi-
tions and thus the expected percentage of distorted financial reports can be calculated as  
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  -  
= × = × × × × -     D -D     ∫  
                                                           
34    For clients that perfectly fit the auditor’s industry specialization ( 0 x = ), the quality of audited financial
 
statements is at its maximum, since  ( ) ( ) 1 0 1 1 B d he Pr Pr q





with  ( ) 0 d Pr n n
* * * ¶ ¶ < .The corresponding measure for the average quality of audited finan-
cial statements is  
(12a) 
( ) ( )
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1 1
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      -
= - - × × × × - × -       D -D      
 
which decreases with  ( ) d Pr n
* *  and – because  ( ) 0
* ¶ ¶ <
* *
d Pr n n  – increases with n
*. That 
is, the greater the number of active audit firms in the market, the higher the average quality of 
audited financial statements. 
4.  The Effect of Non-audit Services 
4.1.  Case II: General Consulting Services  
In this section, we investigate the effects of the joint provision of consulting services on 
audit fees, on the equilibrium number of audit firms, and on the quality of audited financial 
statements. As mentioned above, we differentiate between two scenarios regarding the scope 
of non-audit services audit firms are permitted to supply to their audit clients. We begin with 
Case II, in which audit firms are only allowed to offer general, non-audit-related consulting 
services that are clearly distinct from the audit service. Because in Case II both audit and non-
audit fees are negotiated at the beginning of the period, they can be regarded as sunk in the 
game between auditors and clients. Therefore, non-audit fees do not have any immediate in-
fluence on the players’ decisions; in particular, non-audit fees do not affect auditor indepen-
dence.
35 Moreover, we assume that the provision of consulting services does not directly af-
fect audit costs, e.g., through knowledge spillovers. As audit firms in our model are homoge-
neous except for their location on the unit circle, we assume that each audit firm has the same 
                                                           
35  In our model, an increase in auditor-client “economic bonding” due to non-audit fees would impair auditor 
independence only in a multi-period setting, provided that the client has an incentive to replace an auditor 
who has refused to issue a clean opinion. For this incentive to evolve endogenously, additional assumptions 
would be necessary, since the incumbent auditor is always cost-efficient. However, there is also empirical 
evidence showing that independence is not necessarily impaired: Raghunandan et al. 2003 did not find signif-
icant differences in unexpected non-audit fees, fee ratios, and total fees between firms issuing restatements 
and a control group; that is, the idea that non-audit services affect audit quality (leading to the need for res-
tatements) is not supported. Hay et al. 2006a did not find evidence that the provision of non-audit services 
impairs auditor independence, and DeFond et al. 2002 did not find a significant association between non-





share of 1 n of the market for consulting services.
36 In addition, we assume that auditors earn 
some fixed profit contribution  GC p  per client from the provision of consulting services.
37 
Taking into account this positive profit contribution from the provision of consulting ser-
vices, the total profit contribution of an arbitrary audit firm i  can be represented as  
(14) 











E PC n E pc x dx
E PC n n
p
p
      = × +      
  = +  
∫  
For  a  given  number  of  audit  firms  n ,  ( )    
i
GC E PC n  for  Case  II  is  clearly  larger  than 
( )    
i E PC n  for Case I (in which the provision of non-audit services was not allowed). The 
equilibrium number of audit firms  GC n
* can again be found by solving  
(15)  ( )
i
GC GC FA FGC E PC n c c
*   = +    
for  GC n
*
, where  FGC c  denotes the fixed costs additionally incurred by audit firms that also 
offer general consulting services. In line with anecdotal evidence from business practice, we 
assume  that  the  provision  of  consulting  services  is  quite  profitable  for  audit  firms,  i.e., 
GC FGC n c p
* > .
38 Consequently, the equilibrium number of audit firms is greater than that 
found in Case I, i.e.,  GC n n
* * > . Thus, the number of audit firms is larger when there is an op-
portunity to win profitable consulting contracts. In other words, the prohibition of the joint 
supply of audit and general consulting services would decrease the number of suppliers, i.e., 
further increase the already high level of audit market concentration.
39 The EU Commission, 
however, has not taken the possibility of an intermediate-term reduction in the number of 
suppliers into account. On the contrary, it argues that concerns of independence require that 
the provision of non-audit services to a certain company should preclude an audit firm from 
carrying out the statutory audit of that company. The consequence would be a reduction in the 
                                                           
36   Provided that audit firms have identical market shares from providing consulting services, we obtain qualita-
tively similar results even if not all clients demand consulting services. Furthermore, our results do not de-
pend on whether an audit firm offers consulting services to its own audit clients or to the competitors’ clients. 
37  We would obtain similar results if we assumed the profit contribution to be dependent on the distance be-
tween audit firm and client. 
38  It has often been argued that audit firms lower audit fees to get a foot in the door in order to sell the more 
profitable non-audit services, i.e., auditing serves as a “loss leader” (see Antle et al. 2006; Knechel 2007).  
39  This effect would be intensified if some audit firms decided to leave the audit market to focus on non‐audit 




number of audit firms available to provide statutory audits (for large public-interest entities in 
particular). To secure a minimum number of audit firms available to large public-interest enti-
ties, the EU Commission thus requests “that audit firms of significant dimension focus their 
professional activity on the carrying out of statutory audit and are not allowed to undertake 
other services unconnected to their statutory audit function such as consultancy or advisory 
services.”
40 However, our model predicts that this reform would lead to a further increase in 
the level of audit market concentration.  
Our results also contradict the EU Commission’s expectation that the prohibition of non-
audit  services  will  increase  the  quality  of  audited  financial  statements:  Since
( ) 0 d Pr n n
* * * ¶ ¶ < , it is clear that the percentage of distorted financial reports in Case II is 
lower than that found in Case I (in which consulting services were prohibited), i.e.,  
(16)  ( ) ( ) d GC d Pr n Pr n
* * * * <  
(see also Figure 3). In Case II, the average quality of audited financial statements is therefore 
higher than in Case I, i.e.,  
(17)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 GC B d GC he B d he Pr n Pr Pr n Pr q q
* * * * * * F = - × × - > F = - × × - . 
The reasoning behind this result is that the additional profit contribution earned from provid-
ing non-audit services increases the number of audit firms (i.e., decreases the level of audit 
market concentration). Thus, comparatively more clients can be matched with a specialist 
audit firm, which decreases the additional costs of exerting high audit effort; this, in turn, de-
creases the managers’ average probability of misreporting.
41 
An additional effect of the joint provision of audit and non-audit services is that average 
audit fees are lower: Every auditor’s nearest competitor has lower fee-determining costs than 
in Case I, since additional suppliers lead to a decrease in the distance between competitors. A 
prohibition of the joint supply of audit and general consulting services would thus increase 
audit fees. In sum, the implementation of a ban on “single-provider” auditing and consulting 
would have undesirable effects on the level of supplier concentration and also on the average 
quality of audited financial statements. These effects would be even more pronounced if we 
                                                           
40   Commission of the European Communities 2011b, p. 15. 
41  Lim/Tan 2008 found that audit quality (i.e., the propensity to issue going-concern opinions, the propensity to 
miss analyst forecasts, and the earnings-response coefficient) increases with the level of non-audit services 




explicitly assumed that the additional costs for exerting high audit effort would decrease due 
to beneficial knowledge spillovers from non-audit to audit services.  
4.2.  Case III: Audit-Related Consulting Services 
In this section, we address the concern that non-audit services would impair auditor inde-
pendence.
42 In general, there are two lines of reasoning: First, non-audit services could nega-
tively affect auditor independence because auditors would risk losing a possibly substantial 
amount of non-audit fees in addition to the audit fee if they truthfully report errors and miss-
tatements in their client’s financial reporting to the public (“economic bonding”). Second, 
clients might directly use non-audit fees to “bribe” their auditor to not report unfavorable 
findings. In this section, we focus on the second argument, assuming that managers can buy 
additional non-audit services after an auditor has detected misrepresentations of a company’s 
bad economic position.
43 If, however, the demand for non-audit services results primarily 
from managers’ attempts to influence auditors to issue clean audit opinions, managers will 
presumably buy audit-related non-audit services rather than general consulting services, either 
because the audit committee would not have to approve this decision, or because the commit-
tee would be less skeptical of such a move than of a sudden additional demand for general 
consulting services.  
We regard the costs audit firms must incur for supplying audit-related consulting services 
as independent from the distance x between audit firm and client. This assumption is moti-
vated by the fact that an auditor who has conducted an audit has already invested some dis-
tance-dependent costs in order to become familiar with the client’s business operations. We 
assume that the auditor demands a fixed mark-up in order to issue a clean audit opinion 
against his or her better knowledge, i.e., we consider the profit contribution from non-audit 
services to be distance-independent. In our model, the client’s motive in buying non-audit 
services is to influence the auditor’s reporting strategy rather than to derive some additional 
utility from the consumption of non-audit services.
44 Thus, clients will not choose a supplier 
                                                           
42  Sharma/Sidhu 2001 and Frankel et al. 2002 provide evidence that auditor independence might be compro-
mised when clients pay relatively high non-audit fees. Firth 2003 finds that companies paying relatively high 
consultancy fees are more likely to receive a clean audit opinion.  
43   We implicitly assume that if a contract for non-audit services is signed, auditors would rather issue a clean 
opinion against their better knowledge than push the manager to correct a misleading report. In our model, a 
correction of a report of r(B) = G to r(B) = B could be precluded if the manager’s disutility after truthfully 
reporting a bad economic condition were taken into account in setting non-audit fees. Doing so, however, 
would not yield additional insight. 
44  However, Lau/Mensah 2009 found that payments to auditors for non-audit services are positively related to 




other than their auditor for non-audit services. Particularly in the case of audit-related consult-
ing services, the demand of the two services from the same supplier can be frequently ob-
served in business practice.  
Consider the situation in which the auditor has exerted high audit effort and thus was able 
to detect that the client had misreported. In contrast to Case I, in which an auditor would 
refuse to issue a clean opinion when aware of a client’s false report, the auditor and the client 
now have the option to use a consulting contract as a valuable consideration in determining 
the auditor’s decision. Such a contract is acceptable for the client if the additional non-audit 
fee,  ARC fee , does not exceed the decrease in utility resulting from a qualified opinion, i.e., if 
ARC d fee d £ . The auditor would agree on such a contract if the profit contribution from offer-
ing  non-audit  services,  ARC p ,  is  at  least  as  high  as  possible  reputational  effects,  i.e.,  if 
ARC R p ³ . Obviously, the profit contribution from non-audit services cannot exceed non-audit 
fees. Thus, we summarize our conditions as  ARC ARC d R fee d p £ £ £ . The respective decisions 
of the players are as follows: 
When managers truthfully report  ( ) r B B = , auditors still always choose low audit effort. 
Provided that the auditor and the client agree upon a non-audit services contract after the audi-
tor detects fraudulence in the manager’s report of  ( ) r B G = , the auditor will not report this 
finding to the public, i.e.,  0 = r Pr . When managers report  ( ) r G G =  or  ( ) r B G = , auditors 
will exert high audit effort if the probability of a distortion in the financial statements,  dARC Pr , 
is relatively high. Auditors are indifferent with respect to conducting high or low effort if 
managers report  ( ) r B G =  with probability  
(18)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 B B
dARC d
B ARC B
a x a x
Pr x Pr
a x R a x
q q
q p q
* * - - D × D ×
= × £ = ×
-D × -D ×
, since  ARC R p ³ . 
The possibility to buy audit-related consulting services during the audit process thus tends to 
decrease the individual probability that a specific client will misreport, since the auditor’s 
payoff after observing that financial statements are misleading increases by the additional 
profit contribution from non-audit services.  1 dARC Pr
* <  is always fulfilled, as  1 d Pr
* <  is as-
sumed to hold.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
indeed seems to provide value to the firm. Even if non-audit fees are primarily intended to compromise audi-




Managers, however, also consider the (valuable) possibility of getting a clean audit opinion 
even after having misreported. They are indifferent with respect to misreporting or truthfully 
reporting a bad economic condition if the probability of auditors exerting high effort after 





d m d m
Pr Pr
fee d
* * - -
= ³ = , since  ARC d fee d £ . 
After having misreported, managers must pay additional non-audit fees in order to get a clean 
audit opinion, but at the same time they avoid the decrease in utility  d d  resulting from receiv-
ing a qualified audit opinion. Since  ARC d fee d £ , the managers’ net payoff after misreporting 
does not decrease, which, in turn, tends to increase the probability that the auditors will exert 
high effort. To ensure that  1 heARC Pr
* <  holds, we assume  ARC t fee d m > - .  
These probabilities specify the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for Case III. Ceteris 
paribus, the individual probabilities of false reports of  ( ) r B G =  tend to decrease, whereas 
the probabilities for high audit effort tend to increase in comparison to Case I, given an arbi-
trary pair of audit firm and client.  
In order to compare Case III with Case I, we assume that audit firms have superior bar-
gaining power and thus obtain the benefits resulting from the joint supply of audit-related 
consulting services, i.e.,  ARC d fee d =  and  ARC R p > . The optimal strategies are therefore  





















= = . 
Due  to  their  superior  bargaining  power,  exclusively  auditors  benefit  from  the  additional 
supply of non-audit services; managers – in order to render auditors indifferent regarding their 
pure audit effort strategies – react with a decrease in their probability to misreport; managers’ 
payoffs and thus auditors’ strategies remain unchanged. 
The expected direct audit costs of audit firm i  can be calculated as:  
(20)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
i
ARC le B heARC B heARC dARC E c x a Pr a Pr a Pr x x q q




Since  ( ) ( ) dARC d Pr x Pr x
* * < , the expected direct costs of conducting the audit in Case III are 
lower than in Case I, i.e.,  ( ) ( )
i i
ARC E c x E c x     <     .  
In calculating the expected reputational effects, we must take into account the fact that if 
the economic condition of the firm is bad and managers misreport, audit firms in any case 
suffer the loss RL (either because they do not detect the false report due to their low audit 
effort, or because they accept the loss in order to gain a consulting contract). For simplicity, 
we assume that the loss RL for the two scenarios is identical; that is, for reputational damages 
and legal liability, it does not matter whether the incorrect audit opinion results from low ef-
fort or from impaired independence. The expected reputational effect is thus given by  
(21)  ( ) ( ) ( )
i
ARC B dARC E Re x RL Pr x q
*   = × - ×   .  
The opportunity to additionally earn the (positive) profit contribution from non-audit ser-
vices,  ARC p , can be denoted by  
(22)  ( ) ( )
i
ARC B heARC ARC dARC E Opp x Pr Pr x q p
* *   = × × ×   . 
Combining (21) and (22) leads to the expected consulting-adjusted reputational effect:  
(23) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
adj i i i
ARC ARC ARC
B heARC ARC dARC
E Re x E Re x E Opp x
Pr RL Pr x q p
* *
      = +      
= × × - ×
. 
Since  ARC R p > , the consulting-adjusted reputational effect for one specific client in Case III 
is  less  severe  than  its  equivalent  in  Case  I,  i.e.,  ( ) ( )
i adj i
ARC E Re x E Re x     <     .  Moreover, 
( )
adj i








× > , 
which would indicate that expected reputational losses are more than offset by the profit con-
tribution earned from non-audit services.  
The expected reputation-adjusted audit costs are thus  
(24) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )




      = -      
  = + - × ×D + × ×D × ×  
- × × - ×
i i adj i
ARC ARC ARC
le B heARC B heARC dARC
B heARC ARC dARC
E C x E c x E Re x
a Pr a Pr a Pr x x







If the auditor can sell additional non-audit services, both the decrease in expected direct audit 
effort costs ( ( ) ( )
i i
ARC E c x E c x     <     ) and the attenuation of the consulting-adjusted reputa-
tional effect ( ( ) ( )
i adj i
ARC E Re x E Re x     <    ) result in a decrease in the expected overall audit 
costs ( ( ) ( )
i i
ARC E C x E C x     <    ).  
The audit fees of audit firm i  again are determined by the expected reputation-adjusted 
audit costs of its nearest competitor  1 i- :  
(25)  ( ) ( )
1 1
i i
ARC ARC fee x E C n x
-   = -   . 
Given a certain number n of audit firms, we can conclude that the average demanded audit 
fees in Case III are lower than in Case I, as the competitors’ expected overall costs also de-
crease, i.e.,  ( ) ( )
i i
ARC fee x fee x < .  
The profit contribution of audit firm i  can be represented by  
(26)  ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i
ARC ARC ARC E pc x fee x E C x     = -    .  
Integration and consideration of both sides of the unit circle leads to the overall profit contri-
bution:  
(27) 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )















    = ×    
= + - × ×D
  + × × ×D × - × - - ×  
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which can be simplified to 
(27a) 
( ) ( )









    = ×    








E PC n E pc x dx
a n a
RL ln .








Compared to Case I, the overall audit costs and thus also the audit fees demanded are smaller 
when the auditor can supply additional audit-related consulting services. However, given a 
certain number n of audit firms, the overall profit contribution of an arbitrary audit firm is 
smaller for the case with audit-related consulting services than for the initial case without 
consulting,  i.e.,  ( ) ( )
i i
ARC E PC n E PC n     <      as  ( ) 0
i
ARC ARC E PC n p   ¶ ¶ <   .  This  result  is 
illustrated in Figure 4 (again, for simplicity we assume linear costs). 
Figure 4 
Taking the fixed costs into account and solving for n leads to the equilibrium number of 
audit firms on the market,  ARC n
*:  
(28)  ( )
i
ARC ARC FA E PC n c
*   =   .
45  
As  ( ) 0
i
ARC PC n n ¶ ¶ < , the equilibrium number of audit firms in the three cases can be or-
dered as follows:  ARC GC n n n
* * * < < . Thus, the equilibrium number of audit firms is smaller 
when audit firms are allowed to offer audit-related non-audit services to their audit clients in 
comparison to a situation in which consulting is prohibited. A ban on this kind of consulting 
services would thus indeed increase the number of audit firms active in the market, i.e., re-
duce the level of supplier concentration. This raises the question of whether a ban on “single-
provider” auditing and consulting would also improve the quality of audited financial state-
ments and should therefore be implemented.
46 
The average probability that a manager will misrepresent a bad economic condition in his 
or her firm and thus the expected percentage of distorted financial reports can be calculated by  
(29) 










dARC ARC ARC dARC
B * ARC ARC
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B ARC ARC
Pr n n Pr x dx







  -  
= × × × × -     D -D    
∫
  
                                                           
45   In order to avoid additional complexity, we refrain from introducing additional fixed costs for offering audit-
related consulting services.  
46  The empirical evidence on the question of whether non‐audit services impair auditor independence and audit 
quality is mixed. Ruddock et al. 2006 found that higher than expected levels of non-audit services are not as-
sociated with reduced news-based conservatism. Ashbaugh et al. 2003 present evidence that non-audit fees 
do not affect performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals and that there is no statistically significant 




However, as  ( ) 0
* *
dARC ARC ARC Pr n n
* ¶ ¶ <  and  ( ) 0
*
dARC ARC ARC Pr n p
* ¶ ¶ < , we do not have a 
clear comparison between Case III and Case I regarding the average distortion probability. 
On the one hand, the number of audit firms is lower in Case III, which leads to a larger num-
ber of distorted financial reports, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, the lower profit contribu-
tion in Case III leads to a decrease in the average probability of deception.  
In determining the quality of audited financial statements, we must take into account the 
fact that a distorted financial statement never becomes publicly observable, either because 
auditors do not detect false reports due to their low audit effort or because auditors compro-
mise  their  independence.  The  corresponding  measure  for  the  quality  of  audited  financial 
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F = - ×
   
= - - × × × × -     D -D    
 
Again, we cannot predict a clear effect, but the quality of audited financial statements in Case 
III decreases in most of the parameter constellations.  
We can make the following qualitative comparison of Cases II and III: In Case II, the pro-
vision of profitable consulting services increases the audit firms’ profit contributions, given a 
certain number n of audit firms. The managers’ individual probability of misreporting re-
mains constant for a given distance x and a given number n of audit firms. The higher profit 
contribution, however, increases the equilibrium number of audit firms. Thus, the average 
distance between audit firms and clients, and thus the average probability to misreport, de-
creases. In Case III, in contrast, the managers’ individual probability of misreporting decreas-
es in order to render the auditor indifferent with respect to exerting high or low audit effort. 
This decreases audit costs, audit fees, and the profit contribution derived from auditing. Thus, 
the equilibrium number of audit firms decreases. 
5.    Summary and Conclusion 
In the present paper, we use a formal model to analyze the effects that a ban on the joint 
provision of audit and non-audit services could have on the level of audit market supplier 
concentration and on the quality of audited financial statements. Specifically, we embed the 




reputational effects are determined) into a market matching model. Our two-stage set-up al-
lows us to simultaneously analyze the various effects of a joint provision of audit and non-
audit services. First, we are able to investigate the direct effect of a joint supply of the two 
services on the quality of audited financial statements (i.e., the managers’ optimal reporting 
decisions  and  the  auditors’  optimal  decisions  regarding  audit  effort  and  independence). 
Second, we can predict the qualitative effects on the equilibrium structure of the audit market, 
effects that depend on audit firms’ profits and thus on the scope of services audit firms are 
permitted to provide. Third, our model allows investigation of the interdependencies between 
audit firms’ market shares and the quality of audited financial statements. As a result, our 
work contributes to the recent discussion of regulatory reforms intended to simultaneously 
address both the structure of the audit market and concerns regarding auditor independence.
47 
Our results indicate that a ban on general consulting services reduces audit firms’ profits 
and thus decreases the equilibrium number of audit firms (i.e., increases market concentra-
tion). Moreover, a prohibition of the joint provision of the two services can have negative 
effects on the quality of audited financial statements, since the managers’ average probability 
of misreporting increases. These effects are diametrically opposed to the aims the Commis-
sion has outlined in its Green Paper. With regard to the prohibition of audit-related consulting 
services demanded in order to “bribe” auditors, we predict a resulting increase in the equili-
brium number of audit firms. However, the effect on the quality of audited financial state-
ments cannot be exactly determined, so we cannot confirm the Commission’s expectation of a 
clear positive effect. Moreover, our results are in line with the argument that a high level of 
audit market concentration does not necessarily mean that audit quality is low.
48 The effects 
of a ban on “single-provider” auditing and consulting crucially depend on the point in time at 
which consulting services are negotiated. 
Our analysis has several limitations. First, depending on the parameter constellations cho-
sen, a wide variety of outcomes are possible; however, we demonstrate that not all of these 
outcomes are desirable from the regulator’s perspective. Second, the determination of the spe-
cific outcome that will occur depends largely on the players’ payoffs, the allocation of bar-
gaining power, the level of competition, the suppliers’ cost structures, and audit firms’ adap-
                                                           
47   See Commission of the European Communities 2010. 
48  For example, the Swiss Federal Audit Oversight Authority argues that it “identified a larger average number 
of deficiencies per firm review at the small to medium-sized state-regulated audit firms than at the annually-
inspected Big 3” (Federal Audit Oversight Authority FAOA 2010, p. 20), indicating that a high level of sup-
plier concentration does not necessarily imply a low level of audit quality. The chairman of the PCAOB, 
James Doty, also speculated that measures to promote competition might have a negative effect on audit 




tive reactions to regulatory changes. With regard to some of these aspects, there is to date 
only limited empirical evidence. Third, the situations in Member States can greatly vary, such 
that one may question whether, from an economic perspective, a meaningful EU-wide solu-
tion can be found. It is likely that if implemented as proposed, these new regulations will re-






Figure 1:   Decisions and payoffs for the game analyzing the strategic auditor-client 
interaction  
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Figure 2:   Audit firms and clients on the unit circle 












Figure 3:   The probability that managers will misreport a bad economic condition, given a 
low number n
* (above) or a high number  GC n
* (below) of audit firms 






Figure 4:  An audit firm’s overall profit contributions in Case I (above) and Case III, given a 
certain number of audit firms n .   
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